The Resource A study of the property rights constraints in U.S. agricultural cooperatives : theory and evidence, by Constantine Iliopoulos

A study of the property rights constraints in U.S. agricultural cooperatives : theory and evidence, by Constantine Iliopoulos

Label
A study of the property rights constraints in U.S. agricultural cooperatives : theory and evidence
Title
A study of the property rights constraints in U.S. agricultural cooperatives
Title remainder
theory and evidence
Statement of responsibility
by Constantine Iliopoulos
Title variation
Property rights constraints in cooperatives
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
This research addresses the issue of efficient user-owned and controlled organizational design. Using agricultural cooperatives as an example set of user-owned and controlled institutional arrangements, this study examines the degree of residual rights of control and residual claims alignment. Leading organizational scholars suggest an advantage, in the case of a firm, of having as many decision-rights as possible vested with the party receiving the residual returns, because in the process of maximizing individual returns organizational efficiency will generally also be maximized. Until now, scholarly work has concentrated on investor-oriented forms of business organization. This study explores the applicability of the residual claims-residual control rights-argument to alternative business forms. The strength of the residual claims-residual control rights-criterion related to user-owned firms is examined by applying the Coasian "nexus of contracts" definition of efficiency to agricultural cooperatives in US. From a neo-institutional point of view, this study is concerned with the design of a producer-driven, collective action, business organization--an ex ante contract which assigns residual rights of control and residual claimant rights in an organizational efficiency-maximizing way. In designing such an efficiency-maximizing institutional arrangement, several important questions--related to the property rights structure, stakeholder incentives, and resulting inefficiencies--must be addressed. Answers to these questions are sought by developing a neo-institutional theoretical framework for analyzing and comparing alternative firm ownership structures. The impact of the property rights structure on investment incentives facing cooperative stakeholders has been crystallized into three problems: the free rider, the horizon, and the portfolio constraints. The main hypothesis of this research is that cooperative property rights structures significantly affect members' incentives to invest in their organizations. To test this hypothesis, a structural equation model with latent variables is developed and tested against data from a national survey of US agricultural cooperatives. The results strongly support the above postulated hypothesis and have serious implications for cooperative organizational design, economic efficiency and investment decisions, as well as for public policy
Additional physical form
Also available on the Internet.
Cataloging source
MUU
http://library.link/vocab/creatorDate
1966-
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Iliopoulos, Constantine
Degree
Ph. D.
Dissertation year
1998.
Government publication
government publication of a state province territory dependency etc
Granting institution
University of Missouri-Columbia
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
no index present
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Right of property
  • Agriculture, Cooperative
  • Theory of constraints (Management)
  • Incentive (Psychology)
Target audience
specialized
Label
A study of the property rights constraints in U.S. agricultural cooperatives : theory and evidence, by Constantine Iliopoulos
Instantiates
Publication
Note
  • Typescript
  • Vita
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 269-285)
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Control code
43556065
Dimensions
29 cm
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
xix, 286 leaves
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations
Specific material designation
remote
Label
A study of the property rights constraints in U.S. agricultural cooperatives : theory and evidence, by Constantine Iliopoulos
Publication
Note
  • Typescript
  • Vita
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 269-285)
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Control code
43556065
Dimensions
29 cm
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
xix, 286 leaves
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
c
Other physical details
illustrations
Specific material designation
remote

Library Locations

    • University of Missouri Libraries DepositoryBorrow it
      2908 Lemone Blvd, Columbia, MO, 65211, US
      38.919360 -92.291620
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