Borrow it
Coverart for item
The Resource Crisis and escalation in cyberspace, Martin C. Libicki

Crisis and escalation in cyberspace, Martin C. Libicki

Creator
Author
Contributor
Summary
"The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace, with the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. The genesis for this work was the broader issue of how the Air Force should integrate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Central to this process was careful consideration of how escalation options and risks should be treated, which, in turn, demanded a broader consideration across the entire crisis-management spectrum. Such crises can be managed by taking steps to reduce the incentives for other states to step into crisis, by controlling the narrative, understanding the stability parameters of the crises, and trying to manage escalation if conflicts arise from crises."--Page 4 of cover
Language
eng
Work
Publication
Extent
1 online resource (xxvi, 172 pages)
Note
"Prepared for the United States Air Force ... Rand Project Air Force."
Contents
  • Ch. 1: Introduction -- ch. 2: Avoiding crises by creating norms -- ch. 3: Narratives, dialogue, signals -- ch. 4: Escalation management -- ch. 5: Implications for strategic stability -- ch. 6: Can cybercrises be managed -- Appendix A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- Appendix B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Appendix C. Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks?
  • Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses
Isbn
9780833076786
Instance
Label
Crisis and escalation in cyberspace
Title
Crisis and escalation in cyberspace
Statement of responsibility
Martin C. Libicki
Creator
Contributor
Author
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
"The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace, with the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. The genesis for this work was the broader issue of how the Air Force should integrate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Central to this process was careful consideration of how escalation options and risks should be treated, which, in turn, demanded a broader consideration across the entire crisis-management spectrum. Such crises can be managed by taking steps to reduce the incentives for other states to step into crisis, by controlling the narrative, understanding the stability parameters of the crises, and trying to manage escalation if conflicts arise from crises."--Page 4 of cover
Member of
Cataloging source
DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Libicki, Martin C
Dewey number
358.4/141
Illustrations
charts
Index
no index present
LC call number
U163
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Project Air Force (U.S.)
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • United States
  • United States
  • Information warfare
  • Escalation (Military science)
  • Cyberspace
  • Crisis management
  • Cyberterrorism
  • Conflict management
  • United States
  • COMPUTERS
  • TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING
  • Armed Forces
  • Conflict management
  • Cyberterrorism
  • Escalation (Military science)
  • Information warfare
  • United States
Label
Crisis and escalation in cyberspace, Martin C. Libicki
Instantiates
Publication
Note
"Prepared for the United States Air Force ... Rand Project Air Force."
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 163-172)
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Ch. 1: Introduction -- ch. 2: Avoiding crises by creating norms -- ch. 3: Narratives, dialogue, signals -- ch. 4: Escalation management -- ch. 5: Implications for strategic stability -- ch. 6: Can cybercrises be managed -- Appendix A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- Appendix B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Appendix C. Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks?
  • Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses
Control code
818866398
Extent
1 online resource (xxvi, 172 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780833076786
Lccn
2012046778
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
color charts
http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId
  • 22573/ctt24fwq9
  • 628f4d3a-9b1f-4627-965e-efd31d4a7da1
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)818866398
Label
Crisis and escalation in cyberspace, Martin C. Libicki
Publication
Note
"Prepared for the United States Air Force ... Rand Project Air Force."
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 163-172)
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Ch. 1: Introduction -- ch. 2: Avoiding crises by creating norms -- ch. 3: Narratives, dialogue, signals -- ch. 4: Escalation management -- ch. 5: Implications for strategic stability -- ch. 6: Can cybercrises be managed -- Appendix A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- Appendix B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Appendix C. Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks?
  • Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses
Control code
818866398
Extent
1 online resource (xxvi, 172 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9780833076786
Lccn
2012046778
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other physical details
color charts
http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId
  • 22573/ctt24fwq9
  • 628f4d3a-9b1f-4627-965e-efd31d4a7da1
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)818866398

Subject

Genre

Member of

Library Locations

    • Ellis LibraryBorrow it
      1020 Lowry Street, Columbia, MO, 65201, US
      38.944491 -92.326012

Library Links

Structured data from the Bibframe namespace is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License by University of Missouri Libraries. Additional terms may apply to data associated with third party namespaces.
Processing Feedback ...