Coverart for item
The Resource Game theory, Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole

Game theory, Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole

Label
Game theory
Title
Game theory
Statement of responsibility
Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole
Creator
Contributor
Subject
Language
eng
Cataloging source
DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Fudenberg, Drew
Dewey number
658.4/0353
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
LC call number
HB144
LC item number
.F83 1991
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
Tirole, Jean
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Game theory
  • Economics, Mathematical
  • Teoria Dos Jogos
  • Jeux, Théorie des
  • Mathématiques économiques
  • Spieltheorie
Label
Game theory, Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole
Instantiates
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • 3.
  • Extensive-form games
  • 4.
  • Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions
  • 5.
  • Repeated games
  • III.
  • Static games of incomplete information
  • 6.
  • Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium
  • I.
  • 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design
  • IV.
  • Dynamic games of incomplete information
  • 8.
  • Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection
  • 9.
  • Reputation effects
  • 10.
  • Sequential bargaining under incomplete information
  • V.
  • Static games of complete information
  • Advanced topics
  • 11.
  • More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance
  • 12.
  • Advanced topics in strategic-form games
  • 13.
  • Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium
  • 14.
  • Common knowledge and games
  • Index
  • 1.
  • Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium
  • 2.
  • Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium
  • II.
  • Dynamic games of complete information
Control code
23180038
Dimensions
27 cm
Extent
xxiii, 579 pages
Isbn
9780262061414
Lccn
91002301
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(WaOLN)1391550
Label
Game theory, Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole
Publication
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • 3.
  • Extensive-form games
  • 4.
  • Applications of multi-stage games with observed actions
  • 5.
  • Repeated games
  • III.
  • Static games of incomplete information
  • 6.
  • Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium
  • I.
  • 7. Bayesian games and mechanism design
  • IV.
  • Dynamic games of incomplete information
  • 8.
  • Equilibrium refinements: perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection
  • 9.
  • Reputation effects
  • 10.
  • Sequential bargaining under incomplete information
  • V.
  • Static games of complete information
  • Advanced topics
  • 11.
  • More equilibrium refinements: stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance
  • 12.
  • Advanced topics in strategic-form games
  • 13.
  • Payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium
  • 14.
  • Common knowledge and games
  • Index
  • 1.
  • Games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium
  • 2.
  • Iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium
  • II.
  • Dynamic games of complete information
Control code
23180038
Dimensions
27 cm
Extent
xxiii, 579 pages
Isbn
9780262061414
Lccn
91002301
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
Other physical details
illustrations
System control number
(WaOLN)1391550

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      38.944491 -92.326012
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