Coverart for item
The Resource The normativity of what we care about : a love-based theory of practical reasons, Katrien Schaubroeck

The normativity of what we care about : a love-based theory of practical reasons, Katrien Schaubroeck

Label
The normativity of what we care about : a love-based theory of practical reasons
Title
The normativity of what we care about
Title remainder
a love-based theory of practical reasons
Statement of responsibility
Katrien Schaubroeck
Creator
Author
Subject
Language
eng
Summary
A love-based reason theory as a new perspective in the debate on practical reasons. Reasons and obligations pervade our lives. The alarm clock gives us a reason to get up in the morning, the expectations of colleagues or clients give us a reason to do our jobs well, the misery in developing countries gives us a reason to donate money, headaches give us a reason to take an aspirin. Looking for unity in variety, philosophers wonder what makes a consideration count as a reason to do something. The nature and source of practical reasons has been debated intensively over the last three decennia in analytic philosophy. This book discusses the three most influential theories in current debates, referred to as the desire-based, the value-based, and the rationality-based theories of practical reasons. The author argues that all three are defective because they overlook the role of what agents care about
Member of
Cataloging source
N$T
http://library.link/vocab/creatorDate
1980-
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Schaubroeck, Katrien
Dewey number
100
Index
no index present
LC call number
BC177
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Practical reason
  • PHILOSOPHY
  • PHILOSOPHY
  • PHILOSOPHY
  • Practical reason
Label
The normativity of what we care about : a love-based theory of practical reasons, Katrien Schaubroeck
Instantiates
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Preface; Introduction; Chapter 1; Internalism and externalism: some terminology; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Falk and Frankena; 1.3 The internalist position modified; 1.4 The externalist position elaborated; 1.5 Judgment internalism/externalism versus existence internalism/externalism; 1.6 Other kinds of internalism and externalism; 1.7 Varieties of existence internalism and externalism ; 1.8 Conclusion; Chapter 2; Bernard Williams on practical reasons; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The internal reason theory; 2.3 Refining the sub-Humean model; 2.4 Objections to external reasons
  • 2.4.1 The no-explanatory-force objection2.4.2 The no-motivational-fuel objection; 2.4.3 The obscurity objection; 2.5 The Tess case: an objection to Williams' internal reason theory; 2.6 Conclusion; Chapter 3; Michael Smith on practical reasons; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The moral problem; 3.3 Cognitivism, internalism and Humean motivation; 3.3.1 The objectivity of moral obligations; 3.3.2 The practicality of moral judgements; 3.3.3 The Humean theory of motivation; 3.4 The conceptual analysis of normative reasons; 3.4.1 Platitudes about normative reasons
  • 3.4.2 The advice model (as opposed to the example model)3.4.3 The 'if fully rational' condition: Smith versus Williams; 3.4.4 The analysis captures the platitudes; 3.5 Moral rationalism: the solution to the moral problem; 3.6 Smith's analysis of normative reasons evaluated; 3.6.1 The analysis trivializes convergence; 3.6.2 Why do reasons have to be objective?; 3.6.3 The analysis does not guarantee practicality; 3.6.4 The analysis rests on a false platitude; 3.6.5 Normative reasons and what I would desire if I were fully rational
  • 3.6.6 The advice model is inconsistent with the convergence thesis3.7 Conclusion; Chapter 4; Derek Parfit on practical reasons; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Parfit's externalism; 4.2.1 The obscurity objection rejected; 4.2.2 The no-explanatory-force objection rejected; 4.2.3 The no-motivational-fuel objection rejected; 4.3 Parfit's value-based reason theory; 4.3.1 Internalism and the desire-based reason theory; 4.3.2 Parfit's argument against reductive desire-based reason views; 4.3.3 Parfit's argument against non-reductive desire-based reason views
  • 4.3.4 Arguments in favour of the value-based reason theory4.4 Parfit's normative non-naturalism; 4.4.1 Korsgaard's criticism of realism; 4.4.2 Korsgaard's constructivism; 4.4.3 Parfit's criticism of constructivism; 4.4.4 The non-naturalist account of normativity evaluated; 4.5 Conclusion; Chapter 5; Harry Frankfurt on practical reasons; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2. Frankfurt's theory of care and love; 5.2.1 The hierarchical model; 5.2.2 Care; 5.2.3 Love; 5.3 The love-based reason theory; 5.4 The love-based reason theory evaluated; 5.4.1 Love and desire: both motivating, both natural
Control code
839886096
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (256 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9789461660770
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId
22573/ctt8xn2ss
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)839886096
Label
The normativity of what we care about : a love-based theory of practical reasons, Katrien Schaubroeck
Publication
Antecedent source
unknown
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Color
multicolored
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Preface; Introduction; Chapter 1; Internalism and externalism: some terminology; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Falk and Frankena; 1.3 The internalist position modified; 1.4 The externalist position elaborated; 1.5 Judgment internalism/externalism versus existence internalism/externalism; 1.6 Other kinds of internalism and externalism; 1.7 Varieties of existence internalism and externalism ; 1.8 Conclusion; Chapter 2; Bernard Williams on practical reasons; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The internal reason theory; 2.3 Refining the sub-Humean model; 2.4 Objections to external reasons
  • 2.4.1 The no-explanatory-force objection2.4.2 The no-motivational-fuel objection; 2.4.3 The obscurity objection; 2.5 The Tess case: an objection to Williams' internal reason theory; 2.6 Conclusion; Chapter 3; Michael Smith on practical reasons; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The moral problem; 3.3 Cognitivism, internalism and Humean motivation; 3.3.1 The objectivity of moral obligations; 3.3.2 The practicality of moral judgements; 3.3.3 The Humean theory of motivation; 3.4 The conceptual analysis of normative reasons; 3.4.1 Platitudes about normative reasons
  • 3.4.2 The advice model (as opposed to the example model)3.4.3 The 'if fully rational' condition: Smith versus Williams; 3.4.4 The analysis captures the platitudes; 3.5 Moral rationalism: the solution to the moral problem; 3.6 Smith's analysis of normative reasons evaluated; 3.6.1 The analysis trivializes convergence; 3.6.2 Why do reasons have to be objective?; 3.6.3 The analysis does not guarantee practicality; 3.6.4 The analysis rests on a false platitude; 3.6.5 Normative reasons and what I would desire if I were fully rational
  • 3.6.6 The advice model is inconsistent with the convergence thesis3.7 Conclusion; Chapter 4; Derek Parfit on practical reasons; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Parfit's externalism; 4.2.1 The obscurity objection rejected; 4.2.2 The no-explanatory-force objection rejected; 4.2.3 The no-motivational-fuel objection rejected; 4.3 Parfit's value-based reason theory; 4.3.1 Internalism and the desire-based reason theory; 4.3.2 Parfit's argument against reductive desire-based reason views; 4.3.3 Parfit's argument against non-reductive desire-based reason views
  • 4.3.4 Arguments in favour of the value-based reason theory4.4 Parfit's normative non-naturalism; 4.4.1 Korsgaard's criticism of realism; 4.4.2 Korsgaard's constructivism; 4.4.3 Parfit's criticism of constructivism; 4.4.4 The non-naturalist account of normativity evaluated; 4.5 Conclusion; Chapter 5; Harry Frankfurt on practical reasons; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2. Frankfurt's theory of care and love; 5.2.1 The hierarchical model; 5.2.2 Care; 5.2.3 Love; 5.3 The love-based reason theory; 5.4 The love-based reason theory evaluated; 5.4.1 Love and desire: both motivating, both natural
Control code
839886096
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (256 pages)
File format
unknown
Form of item
online
Isbn
9789461660770
Level of compression
unknown
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
http://library.link/vocab/ext/overdrive/overdriveId
22573/ctt8xn2ss
Quality assurance targets
not applicable
Reformatting quality
unknown
Sound
unknown sound
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)839886096

Library Locations

    • Ellis LibraryBorrow it
      1020 Lowry Street, Columbia, MO, 65201, US
      38.944491 -92.326012
Processing Feedback ...