Coverart for item
The Resource Web and internet economics : 9th international conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013 : proceedings, Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica (eds.)

Web and internet economics : 9th international conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013 : proceedings, Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica (eds.)

Label
Web and internet economics : 9th international conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013 : proceedings
Title
Web and internet economics
Title remainder
9th international conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013 : proceedings
Statement of responsibility
Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica (eds.)
Title variation
WINE 2013
Creator
Contributor
Editor
Subject
Genre
Language
eng
Summary
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2013, held in Cambridge, MA, USA, in December 2013. The 36 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 150 submissions and cover research in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics
Member of
Cataloging source
YDXCP
Dewey number
004.67/8
Illustrations
illustrations
Index
index present
LC call number
TK5105.875.I57
LC item number
W56 2013
Literary form
non fiction
http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/meetingDate
2013
http://bibfra.me/vocab/lite/meetingName
WINE (Conference)
Nature of contents
  • dictionaries
  • bibliography
NLM call number
TK5105.875.I57
http://library.link/vocab/relatedWorkOrContributorName
  • Chen, Yiling
  • Immorlica, Nicole
Series statement
  • Lecture notes in computer science,
  • Lecture notes in computer science. Advanced research in computing and software science
  • LNCS sublibrary. SL 1, Theoretical computer science and general issues
Series volume
8289
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Internet
  • Computer networks
  • World Wide Web
  • Econometrics
  • Internet
  • Computer Communication Networks
  • Computer networks
  • Econometrics
  • Internet
  • Engineering & Applied Sciences
  • Computer Science
Label
Web and internet economics : 9th international conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013 : proceedings, Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica (eds.)
Instantiates
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and author index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods
  • MohammadHossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan and Morteza Zadimoghaddam
  • On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games
  • Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli and Luca Moscardelli
  • Trading Agent Kills Market Information
  • Rainer Böhme and Jens Grossklags
  • Designing Markets for Daily Deals
  • Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta and Bo Waggoner
  • The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem
  • Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu and Moshe Tennenholtz
  • Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3
  • Yogesh Anbalagan, Sergey Norin, Rahul Savani and Adrian Vetta
  • The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship
  • Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill
  • Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments
  • Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Milan Vojnović
  • Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
  • Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger and Martin Starnberger
  • Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions
  • Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier and Vasilis Syrgkanis
  • Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare?
  • Moran Feldman, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz
  • Resolving Braess's Paradox in Random Networks
  • Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas and Paul G. Spirakis
  • The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
  • Vincent Conitzer
  • The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited
  • José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz and Nicolás E. Stier-Moses
  • Can Credit Increase Revenue?
  • Nishanth Dikkala and Éva Tardos
  • Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduling
  • Christoph Dürr, Łukasz Jeż and Óscar C. Vásquez
  • Jealousy Graphs: Structure and Complexity of Decentralized Stable Matching
  • Moshe Hoffman, Daniel Moeller and Ramamohan Paturi
  • Linear Regression as a Non-cooperative Game
  • Stratis Ioannidis and Patrick Loiseau
  • Optimal Allocation for Chunked-Reward Advertising
  • Weihao Kong, Jian Li, Tie-Yan Liu and Tao Qin
  • Bicriteria Online Matching: Maximizing Weight and Cardinality
  • Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni and Morteza Zadimoghaddam
  • Mitigating Covert Compromises
  • Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson and Jens Grossklags
  • Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design
  • Dimitris Fotakis and Emmanouil Zampetakis
  • A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes
  • Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot and Lydia Tlilane
  • Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox
  • Tobias Harks and Philipp von Falkenhausen
  • Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation Games
  • Martin Hoefer and Lisa Wagner
  • Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players
  • Hadi Minooei and Chaitanya Swamy
  • Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism through Social Contribution Games
  • Mona Rahn and Guido Schäfer
  • Welfare-Improving Cascades and the Effect of Noisy Reviews
  • Nick Arnosti and Daniel Russo
  • The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix
  • Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman
  • Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions
  • Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis
  • Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments
  • Strategy-Proof and Efficient Offline Interval Scheduling and Cake Cutting
  • Yuan Tian
  • Pinyan Lu and Lan Yu
  • Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects
  • Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Éva Tardos
  • Exchange Markets: Strategy Meets Supply-Awareness
  • Ruta Mehta and Milind Sohoni
  • A Lemke-Like Algorithm for the Multiclass Network Equilibrium Problem
  • Frédéric Meunier and Thomas Pradeau
Control code
867904213
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xiii, 440 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783642450464
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other control number
10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4
Other physical details
illustrations.
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)867904213
Label
Web and internet economics : 9th international conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013 : proceedings, Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica (eds.)
Publication
Copyright
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references and author index
Carrier category
online resource
Carrier category code
  • cr
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods
  • MohammadHossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan and Morteza Zadimoghaddam
  • On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games
  • Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli and Luca Moscardelli
  • Trading Agent Kills Market Information
  • Rainer Böhme and Jens Grossklags
  • Designing Markets for Daily Deals
  • Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta and Bo Waggoner
  • The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem
  • Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu and Moshe Tennenholtz
  • Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3
  • Yogesh Anbalagan, Sergey Norin, Rahul Savani and Adrian Vetta
  • The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship
  • Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill
  • Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments
  • Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Milan Vojnović
  • Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
  • Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger and Martin Starnberger
  • Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions
  • Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier and Vasilis Syrgkanis
  • Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare?
  • Moran Feldman, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz
  • Resolving Braess's Paradox in Random Networks
  • Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas and Paul G. Spirakis
  • The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
  • Vincent Conitzer
  • The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited
  • José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz and Nicolás E. Stier-Moses
  • Can Credit Increase Revenue?
  • Nishanth Dikkala and Éva Tardos
  • Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduling
  • Christoph Dürr, Łukasz Jeż and Óscar C. Vásquez
  • Jealousy Graphs: Structure and Complexity of Decentralized Stable Matching
  • Moshe Hoffman, Daniel Moeller and Ramamohan Paturi
  • Linear Regression as a Non-cooperative Game
  • Stratis Ioannidis and Patrick Loiseau
  • Optimal Allocation for Chunked-Reward Advertising
  • Weihao Kong, Jian Li, Tie-Yan Liu and Tao Qin
  • Bicriteria Online Matching: Maximizing Weight and Cardinality
  • Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni and Morteza Zadimoghaddam
  • Mitigating Covert Compromises
  • Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson and Jens Grossklags
  • Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design
  • Dimitris Fotakis and Emmanouil Zampetakis
  • A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes
  • Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot and Lydia Tlilane
  • Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox
  • Tobias Harks and Philipp von Falkenhausen
  • Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation Games
  • Martin Hoefer and Lisa Wagner
  • Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players
  • Hadi Minooei and Chaitanya Swamy
  • Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism through Social Contribution Games
  • Mona Rahn and Guido Schäfer
  • Welfare-Improving Cascades and the Effect of Noisy Reviews
  • Nick Arnosti and Daniel Russo
  • The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix
  • Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman
  • Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions
  • Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis
  • Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments
  • Strategy-Proof and Efficient Offline Interval Scheduling and Cake Cutting
  • Yuan Tian
  • Pinyan Lu and Lan Yu
  • Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects
  • Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Éva Tardos
  • Exchange Markets: Strategy Meets Supply-Awareness
  • Ruta Mehta and Milind Sohoni
  • A Lemke-Like Algorithm for the Multiclass Network Equilibrium Problem
  • Frédéric Meunier and Thomas Pradeau
Control code
867904213
Dimensions
unknown
Extent
1 online resource (xiii, 440 pages)
Form of item
online
Isbn
9783642450464
Media category
computer
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • c
Other control number
10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4
Other physical details
illustrations.
Specific material designation
remote
System control number
(OCoLC)867904213

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